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                            Appellant 
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UNITED STEELWORKERS LOCAL 397; JOHN DOES (1-10) 
ABC CORPS (Fictitious Names) SUNOCO PARTNERS, LLC; ROBERT GRAY 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. NJ. No. 2-11-cv-01988) 
District Judge:  Honorable Claire C. Cecchi 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 20, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 17, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
William Klimek appeals the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of United 
Steelworkers Local 397 (“Local 397”), Robert Gray, and Sunoco Partners LLC 
(“Sunoco”). We will affirm, essentially for the reasons stated by the District Court. 
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
Klimek worked as a Sunoco terminal operator from November 2005 until he was 
fired on August 23, 2010, for twice violating Sunoco rules against harassment. The first 
incident occurred in January 2009 when Klimek yelled at another terminal operator and 
used profane language. Afterward, Klimek’s direct supervisor, Romeet Ahuja, met with 
him to tell him his behavior was “not at all tolerated.”1 Then in April 2010, Klimek yelled 
at a Sunoco subcontractor driver after the driver asked Klimek about a light that was out 
in the terminal operator office. The driver reported the incident to Sunoco’s Northeast 
Regional Manager, Gray, who investigated it. The parties dispute the details and extent of 
the investigation, but they agree that on April 23, 2010, Gray informed Klimek—in the 
presence of Klimek’s Local 397 representative, Greg Turner2—that Klimek was accused 
                                              
1 App. 116, 246. 
2 Local 397 was the exclusive bargaining representative for Sunoco operators at its 
Newark terminal, and a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) governed the 
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of “harassing [the driver] and hollering at him.”3 Soon after, Gray recommended that 
Sunoco fire Klimek, and on May 14, 2010, Sunoco approved the termination.  
The same day Sunoco decided to fire him, however, Klimek informed Sunoco he 
needed time off because of a severe gout attack, which ultimately turned into a three-
month leave of absence. He had previously taken a three-month leave of absence in 2008 
for a gout attack. When Klimek returned to work on August 23, 2010, Gray informed 
Klimek that he was fired for violating Sunoco’s harassment policy.  
Following his termination, Klimek asked Turner to file a grievance on his behalf 
pursuant to the CBA. After a Step 1 grievance was denied, Turner planned to file a Step 2 
grievance, but the CBA required Klimek’s signature to do so. Turner tried to contact 
Klimek to get his signature but was unable to reach him because, unbeknownst to Turner, 
Klimek’s phone was out of service for several days around this time. Turner finally spoke 
to Klimek on October 7, 2010, and that evening, Klimek signed the forms. The next 
morning, Turner filed the Step 2 grievance, believing that it was timely, but it was in fact 
one day late and was denied as untimely. Local 397 decided not to appeal this decision.  
Klimek sued Sunoco and Gray for violating the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination (“NJLAD”) by firing him because of his gout.4 Klimek also sued Local 
                                                                                                                                                  
operators’ terms of employment. Klimek was not a Local 397 member, but he was 
advised Local 397 would represent him upon request.  
3 App. 366. 
4 N.J. Stat. § 10:5-12(a). 
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397 and Sunoco for violating § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”).5 
The District Court granted summary judgment for all defendants, and Klimek appealed. 
II.6 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s summary judgment, applying 
the same standard the District Court did.7 We review the record in the light most 
favorable to the nonmovant and will affirm only if “‘there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”8   
III. 
Klimek contends that the District Court misapplied the summary judgment 
standard in concluding no genuine dispute of material fact existed and that the Court 
committed legal error with respect to his LMRA claim. We disagree.   
A. 
Klimek’s NJLAD claim is based on his belief that Sunoco fired him because of his 
gout. An NJLAD claim is analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework from 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.9 For this appeal, the parties concede that Klimek can 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination and that Sunoco had a nondiscriminatory 
                                              
5 29 U.S.C. § 185. 
6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
7 Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 301 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). 
8 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a)).  
9 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 800 A.2d 826, 833 (N.J. 2002).  
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reason for firing him. Therefore, the only question remaining is whether Klimek can 
show that Sunoco’s proffered reason for firing him was a pretext for discrimination.  
To show pretext, Klimek must present some evidence “from which a factfinder 
could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or 
(2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating 
or determinative cause of the employer’s action.”10 It is not enough to show the 
employer’s reasons were mistaken, unwise, imprudent, or incompetent; instead, Klimek 
“must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a 
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.”11 
The District Court correctly concluded that Klimek’s evidence of pretext falls 
short. To start, Gray’s mere knowledge of Klimek’s gout is insufficient to show pretext.12 
Nor does Klimek’s belief that he received a harsher punishment than his conduct 
warranted show pretext. Perhaps Klimek is correct that the two incidents in this case are 
more aptly characterized as something less than harassment, but that only shows that 
Sunoco’s reason for firing him was a mistake or an overreaction, not that it was a pretext 
for discrimination. We are not “a super-personnel department” tasked with correcting 
unduly harsh employment actions; we are instead concerned with whether the reasons for 
                                              
10 Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). 
11 Id. at 765 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
12 See Christopher v. Adam’s Mark Hotels, 137 F.3d 1069, 1073 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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such actions are pretextual.13 Moreover, there is no evidence that Sunoco’s disciplinary 
policy was mandatory; in fact, it expressly “reserves the right to impose penalties 
different than those listed herein.”14 Therefore, even if Sunoco deviated from its policy 
here, any showing of pretext based on that deviation is weak.15 
For the same reasons given by the District Court, we are also unpersuaded by 
Klimek’s efforts to show pretext by highlighting inconsistencies in Gray’s testimony. We 
will not recount each of the alleged inconsistencies here, but suffice it to say that the 
variations between Gray’s recollection of events and others’ recollections do not show 
pretext because they do not sufficiently call into question the nature of the incidents 
involving Klimek and they do not suggest that Sunoco’s decision to fire him was based 
on anything other than those incidents. Klimek argues further that Sunoco treated other 
terminal operators who did not have medical disabilities more favorably than it treated 
him. We disagree because none of the other employees Klimek identifies were 
disciplined for anything resembling harassment or verbal abuse,16 and, as previously 
stated, Sunoco’s disciplinary policy was non-mandatory. Sunoco’s decision to treat 
Klimek’s conduct differently is not evidence of a discriminatory motive.  
                                              
13 Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1995).  
14 App. 108. 
15 See Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1020 (8th Cir. 2008). 
16 See Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that 
comparator evidence usually entails, among other things, a showing that two employees 
“had engaged in similar conduct”). 
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Finally, because we conclude that the District Court correctly granted summary 
judgment for Sunoco, Klimek’s aiding and abetting claim against Gray also fails.17  
B. 
Klimek also brings a hybrid claim under § 301 of the LMRA against Local 397 
and Sunoco. The claims are “inextricably interdependent” because the claims against the 
union and the employer both require proof that the union breached its duty of fair 
representation and that the employer breached the contract.18  
“A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union’s 
conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or 
in bad faith.”19 The only question here is whether Local 397’s conduct was arbitrary. A 
union acts arbitrarily “only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the 
union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as 
to be irrational.”20 A union cannot, for example, “arbitrarily ignore a meritorious 
grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion.”21 But mere negligence by the union does 
not establish a breach of the duty of fair representation.22 
                                              
17 See Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assurance Co., 359 F.3d 296, 307 n.15 (3d Cir. 2004).  
18 DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164–65 (1983). 
19 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). 
20 Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
21 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191. 
22 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372–73 (1990); Riley v. Letter 
Carriers Local No. 380, 668 F.2d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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Here, the District Court rightly decided that Klimek’s claim against Local 397 
fails because Turner was at most negligent in not filing the grievance on time. Citing 
precedent from other circuits, Klimek asks us to hold that a union’s unexplained failure to 
perform a ministerial act, such as timely filing a grievance, is per se arbitrary conduct.23 
We have not recognized a distinction between ministerial and non-ministerial acts, but 
even if we did, it would not help Klimek here because Local 397’s conduct was not 
unexplained. The CBA required Klimek’s signature to file a Step 2 grievance, but Turner 
was unable to obtain Klimek’s signature for several days at least in part because of the 
interruption to Klimek’s phone service. When Turner finally contacted Klimek, they met 
immediately, and Turner filed the grievance the next morning.  
Additionally, Local 397 did not act arbitrarily by not pursuing the grievance after 
it was denied as untimely. The CBA provided that an arbitrator could consider a 
grievance only if it was “properly carried through all the steps of the grievance 
procedure.”24 Therefore, Local 397’s decision to drop the grievance was reasonable. 
And because the claim against Local 397 for breach of the duty of fair 
representation is a “necessary condition precedent” to the claim against Sunoco, the 
District Court correctly concluded that the § 301 claim against Sunoco must fail as well.25  
                                              
23 See Klimek’s Br. 40–42 (citing Beck v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 
Local 99, 506 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2007); Vencl v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 
Local 18, 137 F.3d 420, 426 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
24 App. 78. 
25 Albright v. Virtue, 273 F.3d 564, 576 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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IV. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
